The scoop: Marathon’s R&D pro­gram for Duchenne MD drug like­ly came in at a bar­gain base­ment price

On Fri­day, as news spread about the FDA’s ap­proval of Marathon Phar­ma­ceu­ti­cals’ ap­pli­ca­tion for Em­flaza (de­flaza­cort) as an or­phan drug for Duchenne mus­cu­lar dy­s­tro­phy, CEO Jeff Aronin went on the of­fen­sive over his plans to sell the drug at an $89,000 list price, which im­me­di­ate­ly drew scruti­ny from some long­time ob­servers of the in­dus­try.

Aronin pulled what has be­come a stan­dard play out of the guide book for phar­ma com­pa­nies fac­ing price goug­ing charges. He told re­porters at sev­er­al pub­li­ca­tions, in­clud­ing the Chica­go Tri­bune and the Wall Street Jour­nal, that it would take years for Marathon to be­come prof­itable, con­sid­er­ing all the R&D costs that had been sunk in­to de­flaza­cort. And — like Tur­ing founder Mar­tin Shkre­li, caught on the horns of a con­tro­ver­sy over Dara­prim pric­ing — he vowed that pa­tients would be pro­tect­ed, with pay­ers cov­er­ing the cost.

“We had to start from scratch with the FDA,” Aronin in­sist­ed on a we­bi­nar with par­ents on Fri­day, as he as­sured fam­i­lies that their out-of-pock­et costs would be “ze­ro to low cost” while in­sist­ing that the net price to in­sur­ers was based en­tire­ly on the ex­ten­sive re­search the com­pa­ny com­plet­ed.

“It was a heavy lift,” he told par­ents, “but we did all these tri­als.”

Many of those tri­als he cit­ed, though, prob­a­bly on­ly cost a few hun­dred thou­sand dol­lars. That was one piece of the puz­zle, though, that was omit­ted from Marathon’s de­fense. And you won’t hear a word about it from the FDA, which ac­tive­ly as­sist­ed at every step, hand­ing out valu­able help by step­ping up an ap­proval for a drug that has been wide­ly avail­able at a tiny frac­tion of the cost through over­seas sup­pli­ers and then capped it with a bonus that could eas­i­ly turn an overnight prof­it for Marathon.

Just like Shkre­li?

One dif­fer­ence that’s been point­ed out be­tween Aronin and Shkre­li — who re­cent­ly point­ed out that Aronin and Ova­tion, which he sold to Lund­beck for $900 mil­lion, “in­vent­ed price in­creas­es” — was that Shkre­li sim­ply hiked the price of an old drug he ac­quired for $55 mil­lion and protest­ed that he need­ed the mon­ey from the Dara­prim price hike to do more re­search in­to a bet­ter drug, while Aronin in­vest­ed in a de­vel­op­ment pro­gram for a cheap, gener­ic drug that’s been used around the world for decades to qual­i­fy for an FDA ap­proval in the US for the first time.

The com­pa­ny, Aronin main­tained, con­duct­ed 17 pre­clin­i­cal and clin­i­cal stud­ies to get this drug, plus in-li­cens­ing two old­er stud­ies. The piv­otal tri­al was com­plet­ed orig­i­nal­ly in 1995, be­fore the spon­sor aban­doned it. But the CEO re­fused to de­tail the ac­tu­al hard re­search costs. (Aronin and Marathon have al­so re­fused to re­spond to sev­er­al re­quests for an in­ter­view.)

On Fri­day, though, Marathon went one step fur­ther with the Duchenne par­ents that they’ve been court­ing as Aronin prepped for a mar­ket launch of a drug now OK’d for DMD kids 5 and old­er. In a we­bi­nar, he post­ed a slide of the tri­al pro­gram for de­flaza­cort de­tail­ing the pre­clin­i­cal and clin­i­cal ef­fort.

The we­bi­nar was host­ed by Par­ent Pro­ject Mus­cu­lar Dy­s­tro­phy, one of sev­er­al par­ent groups that counts Marathon as a cor­po­rate spon­sor, which al­so post­ed a link to the event.

Marathon Slide

The slide cites the two old ef­fi­ca­cy stud­ies they ac­quired along with de­tails on 9 pre­clin­i­cal stud­ies, in­clud­ing a mon­key tri­al and two rat stud­ies.

Marathon’s clin­i­cal pro­gram in­volved no new reg­is­tra­tional stud­ies, the pri­ma­ry dri­ver be­hind R&D costs.

There were projects like a drug/drug in­ter­ac­tion study and an ADME study (a stan­dard ab­sorp­tion, dis­tri­b­u­tion, me­tab­o­lism and ex­cre­tion study) and so on. They al­so start­ed an ex­tend­ed ac­cess pro­gram as they put more boys on the steroid ahead of the US mar­ket­ing launch.

Man­u­fac­tur­ing costs for this drug are clear­ly just a frac­tion of what Marathon will be charg­ing, based on the cur­rent price in the UK and Cana­da.

I hand­ed the slide on to two tri­al ex­perts, Bernard Munos, an Eli Lil­ly vet­er­an now run­ning In­no­Think, and David Grainger, who’s found­ed a slate of biotechs from his base at Medicxi in Lon­don. They both ran cost es­ti­mates on what it would take to do this kind of pro­gram.

What did it re­al­ly cost?

Munos and Grainger each came up with a fi­nal fig­ure not far off from what Shkre­li paid to lay his hands on Dara­prim. But they have two dis­tinct­ly dif­fer­ent views of the re­search costs.

Munos turned to G. Sit­ta Sit­tam­palam, an­oth­er de­vel­op­ment vet at Lil­ly who has been close­ly in­volved with the Ther­a­peu­tics for Rare and Ne­glect­ed Dis­eases pro­gram at NIH’s Na­tion­al Cen­ter for Ad­vanc­ing Trans­la­tion­al Sci­ences and with drug re­pur­pos­ing for leukemia at Kansas Uni­ver­si­ty Med­ical Cen­ter.

“From his ex­pe­ri­ence,” notes Munos, “the pre­clin­i­cal work for Em­flaza (the 9 tox stud­ies in red on their slide) can be es­ti­mat­ed at $5-10 mil­lion, and the clin­i­cal de­vel­op­ment pro­gram at $50-60 mil­lion.”

“The stud­ies from the 1990s that Marathon ac­quired were like­ly cheap (<$5 mil­lion) since they were old da­ta that had ba­si­cal­ly no val­ue when they were ac­quired; and from Marathon CEO’s ad­mis­sion need­ed a fair amount of “cleanup” to be us­able. That puts the en­tire pack­age at $65-75 mil­lion.”

Grainger, who spe­cial­izes in low-cost biotech star­tups, looked up the stud­ies he could find on­line, ran the num­bers for the whole thing, and con­clud­ed that this could all be done for much, much less. But his po­ten­tial ini­tial val­u­a­tion for the com­pa­ny al­so reach­es fair­ly close to the $55 mil­lion that Shkre­li paid for Dara­prim be­fore trig­ger­ing his own well-doc­u­ment­ed scheme to rip off the sys­tem.

The whole pre­clin­i­cal ef­fort at Marathon, Grainger says, could be done for less than $2 mil­lion, in­clud­ing $600,000 for a 9-month mon­key study of tox­i­c­i­ty. The clin­i­cal pro­gram is hard­er to map out en­tire­ly, but if you in­clude a max­i­mum amount of $400,000 for a US ADME study, $400,00 for a food ef­fect study and $720,000 for the ex­ten­sion study, it’s not hard to see that Marathon was look­ing at a small over­all bud­get. He added, though, that it was hard to fig­ure what the com­par­i­son study on Cal­cort — the drug sold in the UK — would cost, as it’s not list­ed on clin­i­cal­tri­als.gov.

Then there was over­head. Medicxi likes to run vir­tu­al com­pa­nies, and he es­ti­mates that if this was their op­er­a­tion, they would re­serve $2 mil­lion for over­head, plus $500,000 for ex­ter­nal reg­u­la­to­ry as­sis­tance. “They very prob­a­bly had a larg­er team than we would have had, though,” he adds.

“So that comes to just over $6 mil­lion in to­tal,” he notes in a break­down, “which feels about right to me. If some­one came to Medicxi propos­ing to de­liv­er that op­er­at­ing plan, and want­ed to raise $10 mil­lion to do it, we would think that was a gen­er­ous, but prob­a­bly not out­ra­geous, amount of mon­ey. If any­one told me it would cost them much more than $10 mil­lion, then I’d laugh and say you must be do­ing it wrong!”

“Re­gard­ing your last ques­tion, I can’t of course es­ti­mate what the li­cense to the ef­fi­ca­cy da­ta might have cost. That is, as you say, a wild-card. But if Marathon had come to Medicxi with this pro­pos­al and sug­gest­ed a pre-mon­ey val­u­a­tion of more than $25 mil­lion we would prob­a­bly have walked away. Oth­ers might be more gen­er­ous, but I find it hard to be­lieve it was more than $50 mil­lion.”

The 1% so­lu­tion

To put those es­ti­mates in­to some added con­text, the phar­ma in­dus­try likes to use fig­ures that show the av­er­age cost of new drug de­vel­op­ment is $2.6 bil­lion per ap­proved ther­a­py, all in. Marathon’s cost for R&D — or its ini­tial val­u­a­tion — would have been sig­nif­i­cant­ly less than 1% to 3% of that fig­ure, based on the es­ti­mates I ob­tained.

Marathon claims that its $89,000 list price will net out at around $54,000 a year af­ter dis­counts. Based on their low­er net es­ti­mat­ed price, the R&D bud­get — based on the Munos es­ti­mate — would be the same as the cost for treat­ing few­er than 1,400 pa­tients over the course of 1 year, or rough­ly 8% of the mar­ket. If you use Grainger’s num­bers, it would take few­er than 200 pa­tients to cov­er a bare­bones R&D ef­fort at the claimed net price.

At the list price, it would take a max­i­mum of cov­er­ing 115 pa­tients for a year to cov­er Grainger’s R&D es­ti­mate, and that’s with­out sell­ing the pri­or­i­ty re­view vouch­er they ob­tained from the FDA with the ap­proval — which could eas­i­ly be worth far more than the en­tire re­search/over­head bud­get for Marathon.

Quite a few Duchenne MD par­ents have been turn­ing to Mas­ters Glob­al in the UK for years to buy this drug — an old gener­ic steroid stan­dard avail­able for decades in Cana­da, the UK, etc — for around $1,200 a year. But once the FDA ap­proved it, that and oth­er life­lines got cut off. Now, to ob­tain this steroid, they’ll have to use Marathon’s sup­ply or find a way to cir­cum­vent the law.

Marathon’s price sound­ed like prof­i­teer­ing to peo­ple look­ing at a min­i­mum overnight price hike of about 6000%, a close match to Tur­ing’s 5000% price hike for Dara­prim, which land­ed Shkre­li in a Con­gres­sion­al spot­light. The com­pa­ny’s whole­sale price is al­so un­com­fort­ably close to the con­tro­ver­sial 6-fig­ure prices charged for many new can­cer drugs that spent years in the clin­ic, with the da­ta pub­lished in peer-re­viewed pub­li­ca­tions.

Chris­tine Mc­Sh­er­ry

“They main­tain that the drug is go­ing to be free (to fam­i­lies), with no out-of-pock­et costs,” says Chris­tine Mc­Sh­er­ry, an out­spo­ken cham­pi­on for Sarep­ta’s Ex­ondys 51 who runs The Jett Foun­da­tion. “But it af­fects all of us, all of us. It im­pacts our pre­mi­ums” and may well fac­tor in­to life­time caps on in­sur­ance cov­er­age for a host of Duchenne fam­i­lies. Now Marathon is forc­ing them to add an $89,000 drug to a $300,000 a year drug, she adds, which “at the end of the day is a steroid.”

By her own es­ti­mate, Marathon is rais­ing the cost of a drug that she had paid $2.04 a pill for to $148.33, a hike of more than 7000%.

“At $10,000, come on, you’re still go­ing to make mon­ey,” says Mc­Sh­er­ry. “It puts a bad taste in your mouth.”

How big is this mar­ket?

Pa­tient ad­vo­ca­cy groups say that about 15,000 to 20,000 boys suf­fer from DMD in the US, a dis­ease that first crip­ples them and then slow­ly kills them. De­flaza­cort has be­come a stan­dard ther­a­py in this group be­cause it’s well known to be ef­fec­tive in boost­ing strength, like most steroids, with less weight gain.

Ac­cord­ing to Aronin’s pre­sen­ta­tion to Duchenne par­ents on Fri­day, de­flaza­cort cur­rent­ly is on­ly avail­able to less than 10% of the pa­tient pop­u­la­tion, with the rest cut off, un­able to ob­tain the drug or re­quired to use pred­nisone.

“Hope­ful­ly this is just a start,” Aronin said on Fri­day. “Well over 90% of pa­tients did not have ac­cess to this drug.”

Many physi­cians re­sist­ed pre­scrib­ing an un­ap­proved drug, as many moth­ers re­sist­ed a drug with­out FDA ap­proval, he claimed. “And even, un­for­tu­nate­ly cost” was a fac­tor. “Most pa­tients did not have ac­cess to this drug.”

Ap­proval was the on­ly way to gain ac­cess to this drug, he in­sist­ed. Yes, he added, it took over 6 years, “was a bur­den…The rea­son we got this ap­proved was that so every­body would have ac­cess to this prod­uct.” And now it will be avail­able for low or no cost, with a se­cure, FDA ap­proved safe source for the drug.

“We had to do a lot of of oth­er stud­ies “ to sat­is­fy the FDA, Tim Cu­niff, Marathon’s EVP of drug de­vel­op­ment told par­ents on Fri­day. The food ef­fect study showed no ef­fect of food on dosage. The Cal­cort stur­dy looked at switch­ing from the im­port­ed UK drug, and found sim­i­lar blood lev­els with their ver­sion of de­flaza­cort.

How about off-la­bel pa­tients un­der 5, who weren’t ap­proved for the drug?

Cu­niff re­peat­ed­ly sug­gest­ed that the un­der-5 kids could get the drug cov­ered as well.

“We would ex­pect that an in­sur­er, es­pe­cial­ly for pa­tients al­ready on drug, would fill that pre­scrip­tion,” he added, ex­plain­ing how the com­pa­ny planned to launch a tri­al for tod­dlers. “We’ll han­dle that on a case-by-case ba­sis,” he added, with flex­i­bil­i­ty on com­pas­sion­ate use for the drug.

The block­buster case for de­flaza­cort

But Mc­Sh­er­ry says that fig­ure on pa­tients who have ob­tained de­flaza­cort to date would ap­pear to be a gross un­der­es­ti­mate, based on her per­son­al ex­pe­ri­ence net­work­ing with the tight-knit Duchenne com­mu­ni­ty. None of the par­ents she talks with have had the is­sues Marathon cit­ed in ob­tain­ing the drug. Af­ter reg­u­lar­ly polling Duchenne par­ents about de­flaza­cort, Mc­Sh­er­ry ini­tial­ly es­ti­mat­ed that 40% to 50% of the DMD kids are al­ready on de­flaza­cort and will now be forced to switch to Marathon’s sup­ply, then ad­just­ed that down to a con­ser­v­a­tive 25%.

But there’s no guar­an­tee they can stay on de­flaza­cort now, she adds, par­tic­u­lar­ly if in­sur­ers re­quire them to use pred­nisone, a gener­ic steroid in the US that is sold for pen­nies a pill. And that rais­es big is­sues for pa­tients as well, as pred­nisone — which is not ap­proved for Duchenne MD – is clear­ly not the pre­ferred steroid for Duchenne.

If half of all US pa­tients are put on Marathon’s steroid, that’s at least $405 mil­lion gross a year — $33.7 mil­lion a month — based on their low­er $54,000 an­nu­al net price. The to­tal mar­ket could be worth up to a block­buster bil­lion dol­lars-plus a year in an­nu­al rev­enue.

Be­cause the FDA gave them or­phan sta­tus, Marathon has a 7-year ex­clu­siv­i­ty deal for de­flaza­cort. Based on the com­pa­ny’s whole­sale price of $89,000, that mar­ket is the­o­ret­i­cal­ly worth up to $12.6 bil­lion in to­tal through the full stretch.

The pri­or­i­ty re­view vouch­er giv­en by the FDA with the ap­proval — in recog­ni­tion of its rare dis­ease sta­tus — would cov­er all of Marathon’s R&D costs in­stant­ly, even if it doesn’t come any­where near to fetch­ing the top $350 mil­lion price Ab­b­Vie paid for one of these vouch­ers in 2015.

De­flaza­cort won’t bring in all the high-end mon­ey. But based on ex­pert es­ti­mates, they have the po­ten­tial to blow past their re­search in­vest­ment with just a few months worth of rev­enue when it’s all up and run­ning.

That’s some­thing, though, you’ll nev­er hear from Marathon.

Lessons for biotech and phar­ma from a doc­tor who chased his own cure

After being struck by a rare disease as a healthy third year medical student, David Fajgenbaum began an arduous journey chasing his own cure. Amidst the hustle of this year’s JP Morgan conference, the digital trials platform Medable partnered with Endpoints Studio to share Dr. Fajgenbaum’s story with the drug development industry.

What follows is an edited transcript of the conversation between Medable CEO Dr. Michelle Longmire and Dr. Fajgenbaum, and it is full of lessons for biotech executives charged with bringing the next generation of medicines to patients.

Kathy High (file photo)

Gene ther­a­py pi­o­neer Kathy High has left Spark af­ter com­plet­ing $4.3B union with Roche

Kathy High dedicated the past seven years of her life shepherding experimental gene therapies she’s developed at Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia toward the market as president and head of R&D at Spark Therapeutics. Now that the biotech startup is fully absorbed into Roche — with an FDA approval, a $4.3 billion buyout and a promising hemophilia program to boast — she’s ready to move on.

Roche confirmed her departure with Endpoints News and noted “she will take some well-deserved time off and then will begin a new chapter in a sabbatical at a university.”

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Tim Mayleben (file photo)

Es­pe­ri­on's goldilocks cho­les­terol fight­er wins FDA ap­proval — will its 'tra­di­tion­al' pric­ing ap­proach spur adop­tion?

It’s more effective than decades-old statins but not as good as the injectable PCSK9 — the goldilocks treatment for cholesterol-lowering, bempedoic acid, has secured FDA approval.

Its maker, Esperion Therapeutics, is betting that their pricing strategy — a planned list price of between $10 to $11 a day — will help it skirt the pushback the PCSK9 cholesterol fighters, Repatha and Praluent, got from payers for their high sticker prices.

The sky-high expectations for the pair of PCSK9 drugs that were first approved in 2015 quickly simmered — and despite a 60% price cut, coupled with data showing the therapies also significantly cut cardiovascular risk, sales have not really perked up.

Esperion is convinced that by virtue of being a cheaper oral therapy, bempedoic acid will hit that sweet spot in terms of adoption.

“We’re kind of like the old comfortable shoe,” Esperion’s chief commercial officer Mark Glickman remarked in an interview with Endpoints News ahead of the decision date. “It’s an oral product, once-daily and nontitratable — these are things that just resonate so true with patients and physicians and I think we’ve kind of forgotten about that.”

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James Collins, Broad Institute via Youtube

UP­DAT­ED: A space odyssey for new an­tibi­otics: MIT's ma­chine learn­ing ap­proach

Drug development is complex, expensive and comes with lousy odds of success — but in most cases, if you make it across the finish line brandishing a product with an edge (and play your cards right) it can be a lucrative endeavor.

As it stands, the antibiotic market is cursed — it harbors the stink of multiple bankruptcies, a dearth of innovation, and is consequently barely whetting the voracious appetites of big pharma or venture capitalists. Enter artificial intelligence — the biopharma industry’s cure-all for the pesky process of making a therapeutic, including data mining, drug discovery, optimal drug delivery, and addressable patient population.

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Gilead los­es two more patent chal­lenges on HIV pill, set­ting up court­room fight in Delaware

Gilead sustained two more losses in their efforts to rid themselves of an activist-backed patent lawsuit from the US government over a best-selling HIV pill.

Urged on by activists seeking to divert a portion of Gilead’s revenue to clinics and prevention programs, the Department of Health and Human Services made a claim to some of the patents for the best-selling HIV prevention drug, Truvada, also known as PrEP. Gilead responded by arguing in court that HHS’s patents were invalid.

Today, the US Patent and Trademark Office ruled that Gilead was likely to lose the last two of those challenges as well. The USPTO ruled against Gilead on the first two patents earlier this month.

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Tal Zaks (Moderna via YouTube)

For two decades, a new vac­cine tech­nol­o­gy has been slow­ly ap­proach­ing prime time. Now, can it stop a pan­dem­ic?

Two months before the outbreak, Moderna CMO Tal Zaks traveled from Cambridge, MA to Washington DC to meet with Anthony Fauci and the leaders of the National Institutes of Health.

For two years, Moderna had worked closely with NIH researchers to build a new kind of vaccine for MERS, one of the deadliest new viruses to emerge in the 21st century. The program was one test for a new technology designed to be faster, cheaper and more precise than the ways vaccines had been made for over a century. They had gathered evidence the technology could work in principle, and Fauci, the longtime head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and a longtime advocate for better epidemic preparedness, wanted to see if it, along with a couple of other approaches, could work in a worst-case scenario: A pandemic.

“[We were] trying to find a test case for how to demonstrate if our technology could rapidly prepare,” Zaks told Endpoints News.

Zaks and Fauci, of course, wouldn’t have to wait to develop a new test. By year’s end, an outbreak in China would short circuit the need for one and throw them into 24/7 work on a real-world emergency. They also weren’t the only ones with new technology who saw a chance to help in a crisis.

An ocean away, Lidia Oostvogels was still on vacation and relaxing at her mother’s house in Belgium when her Facebook started changing. It was days after Christmas and on most people’s feeds, the news that China had reported a novel virus to the World Health Organization blurred into the stream of holiday sweaters and fir trees. But on Oostvogels’s feed, full of vaccine researchers and virus experts, speculation boiled: There was a virus in China, something contained to the country, but “exotic,” “weird,” and maybe having to do with animals. Maybe a coronavirus.

Lidia Oostvogels

“I was immediately thinking like, ‘Hey, this is something that if needed, we can play a role,'” Oostvogels told Endpoints.

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Christos Kyratsous (via LinkedIn)

He built a MERS treat­ment in 6 months and then the best Ebo­la drug. Now Chris­tos Kyrat­sous turns his sights on Covid-19

TARRYTOWN, NY — In 2015, as the Ebola epidemic raged through swaths of West Africa, Kristen Pascal’s roommates sat her down on their couch and staged an intervention.

“Are you sure this is what you want to be doing with your life?” she recalls them asking her.

Special report

Pascal, a research associate for Regeneron, had been coming home at 2 am and leaving at 6 am. At one point, she didn’t see her roommate for a week. For months, that was life in Christos Kyratsous’ lab as the pair led a company-wide race to develop the first drug that could effectively treat Ebola before the outbreak ended. For Pascal, that was worth it.

“I’m ok, I don’t have Ebola,” Pascal told them. “I see that death toll rising and I can’t not do something about it.”

Last August, Regeneron learned they had succeeded: In a large trial across West Africa, their drug, REGN-EB3, was vastly more effective than the standard treatments. It was surprise news for the company, coming just 10 months into a trial they thought would take several years and a major victory in the global fight against a deadly virus that killed over 2,000 in 2019 and can carry a mortality rate of up to 90%.

For Kyratsous and Pascal, though, it brought only fleeting reprieve. Just four months after the NIH informed them REGN-EB3 worked, Kyratsous was back in his office reading the New York Times for updates on a new outbreak on another continent, and wondering alongside Pascal and senior management whether it was time to pull the trigger again.

In late January, as the death toll swelled and the first confirmed cases outside China broke double digits, they made a decision. Soon they were back on the phone with the multiple government agencies and their coronavirus partners at the University of Maryland’s Level 3 bio lab. The question was simple: Can Kyratsous and his team use a process honed over two previous outbreaks, and create a treatment before the newest epidemic ends? Or worse, if, as world health experts fear, it doesn’t vanish but becomes a recurrent virus like the flu?

“Christos likes things immediately,” Matt Frieman, Regeneron’s coronavirus collaborator at the University of Maryland, told Endpoints. “That’s what makes us good collaborators: We push each other to develop things faster and faster.”

Kristen Pascal (Regeneron)

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The first time Regeneron tried to respond to a global outbreak, it was something of a systems test, Kyratsous explains from his office at Regeneron’s Tarrytown headquarters. Kyratsous, newly promoted, has crammed it with photos of his family, sketches of viral vectors and a shark he drew for his 3-year-old son. He speaks rapidly – an idiosyncrasy his press person says has only been aggravated this afternoon by the contents of his “Regeneron Infectious Diseases”-minted espresso glass – and he gesticulates with similar fluidity, tumbling through antibodies, MERS, the novel coronavirus, Ebola-infected monkeys.

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Jim Scholefield via PR Newswire

Mer­ck los­es its chief dig­i­tal of­fi­cer, spot­light­ing tal­ent hunt for the hottest ti­tle in Big Phar­ma

Over the last few years we’ve seen the chief digital officer title become one of the hottest commodities in Big Pharma as global organizations hunt the best talent to sharpen the cutting edge of their tech platforms.

But Merck just discovered how hard it may be to keep them focused on pharma.

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Don't let Ab­b­Vie fool FTC with an easy di­vesti­ture, plead crit­ics in lat­est at­tack on $63B Al­ler­gan buy­out

If the FTC must let AbbVie and Allergan go ahead with their merger, at least make them divest their latest blockbuster on the market, a chorus of unions, consumer groups and public interest organizations plead in a new attempt to rein in the megamerger.

There’s a second part to their argument: If the antitrust watchdog does greenlight the divestiture AbbVie wants, then at least ensure the pharma giant cannot corner its future rivals with its exclusionary tactics.

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